

# Z Energy

## Low Fuel Warning Light Comes On

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### OUTPERFORM

We have reviewed our long-term Z Energy (ZEL) volume forecast following the draft Climate Change Commission report and the government's decision to implement a tough tail pipe emissions standard, the upshot being a material cut in long-term volumes. Whilst our revised volume forecast is consistent with the regulatory goals, we view this as a worst case scenario as the hurdles to achieve the goals are high. Importantly, even under the worst case scenario, we still see value in ZEL and retain our OUTPERFORM rating. However, we do not see as much value as previously and cut our target price -20% to NZ\$3.45.

| NZX Code           | ZEL                 | Financials: Mar/             | 20A   | 21E   | 22E  | 23E   | Valuation (x)     | 20A  | 21E  | 22E  | 23E  |
|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Share price        | NZ\$2.66            | NPAT* (NZ\$m)                | 102.2 | 15.6  | 86.8 | 112.6 | PE                | 10.4 | 88.8 | 15.9 | 12.3 |
| Target price       | NZ\$3.45            | EPS* (NZc)                   | 25.6  | 3.0   | 16.7 | 21.7  | EV/EBIT           | 11.9 | 31.0 | 15.0 | 12.3 |
| Risk rating        | High                | EPS growth* (%)              | -47.8 | -88.3 | n/a  | 29.8  | EV/EBITDA         | 6.6  | 10.6 | 7.8  | 7.1  |
| Issued shares      | 520.1m              | DPS (NZc)                    | 16.5  | 0.0   | 23.0 | 23.0  | Price / NTA       | n/a  | 4.6  | 3.7  | 3.5  |
| Market cap         | NZ\$1,384m          | Imputation (%)               | 100   | 100   | 100  | 100   | Cash div yld (%)  | 6.2  | 0.0  | 8.6  | 8.6  |
| Avg daily turnover | 1,227k (NZ\$3,619k) | *Based on normalised profits |       |       |      |       | Gross div yld (%) | 8.6  | 0.0  | 12.0 | 12.0 |

#### What's changed?

- **Earnings:** FY21/FY22/FY23 EBITDAF -2%/-4%/-3% lower to NZ\$237m/NZ\$300m/NZ\$326m
- **Target price:** Cut -20% (-NZ\$0.85) to NZ\$3.45

#### Even adjusting volumes to the worst case scenario, there is still value in ZEL

The question we have tried to answer is whether there is value in ZEL, even if the worst case scenario eventuates. The answer is yes, but clearly the upside is less than if there was no regulatory intervention. Following the Climate Change Commission's (CCC) draft report, the market has focussed on ZEL's long-term future. We believe fossil fuel bans and new emission targets the government is implementing is the worst case scenario for ZEL – there are huge challenges in implementation. That said, we struggle to see the market valuing any other scenario for the foreseeable future. Whilst the long-term outlook may be more challenging, our near-term volume and earnings forecasts are little changed when material reductions not taking place until the late 2020s. Our revised DCF valuation is NZ\$3.36, down from NZ\$4.94 (although ~-30cps is due to cost of capital changes).

#### Near-term positive catalysts should lift ZEL back to NZ\$3.00

We see three short-term positive catalysts for ZEL. 1) The reinstatement of the dividend in FY22 (to be announced at the FY21 result in May). Whilst we have trimmed our forecast -2cps to 23cps to ensure ZEL is debt free by 2035, the FY22 gross dividend yield of 12.0% should be attractive. 2) Confirmation of the refinery conversion. This will release working capital (we estimate ~NZ\$150m) and relative to the current forecast, refinery contribution should lift earnings at least ~+NZ\$10m. 3) Whilst ZEL has taken the top off its guidance range, delivering on guidance is a modest positive in the context of recent years disappointments.

#### Minor changes to near-term forecast

February 2021 volumes were a continuation of the weak January 2021 volumes, although there are some signs of improvement. Our near-term forecast changes are relatively minor as we have trimmed EBITDAF -NZ\$6m to NZ\$237m due to softer than expect volumes and retail margins continue to be under pressure due to rising crude oil prices. We are towards the bottom of ZEL's narrower FY21 EBITDAF NZ\$235m to NZ\$245m guidance range.

## Z Energy (ZEL)

Priced as at 11 Mar 2021 (NZ\$)

2.66

|                                      |             |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| <b>12-month target price (NZ\$)*</b> | <b>3.45</b> |
| Expected share price return          | 29.7%       |
| Net dividend yield                   | 8.6%        |
| Estimated 12-month return            | 38.3%       |

|                             |       |
|-----------------------------|-------|
| <b>Key WACC assumptions</b> |       |
| Risk free rate              | 2.30% |
| Equity beta                 | 0.88  |
| WACC                        | 6.2%  |
| Terminal growth             | -5.0% |

|                               |      |
|-------------------------------|------|
| <b>Spot valuations (NZ\$)</b> |      |
| 1. DCF                        | 3.36 |
| 2. Dividend Yield             | 3.19 |
| 3. Market Multiple            | 3.12 |

|                                      |       |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| <b>DCF valuation summary (NZ\$m)</b> |       |
| Total firm value                     | 2,469 |
| (Net debt)/cash                      | (723) |
| Less: Capitalised operating leases   | 0     |
| Value of equity                      | 1,746 |

| <b>Profit and Loss Account (NZ\$m)</b> | <b>2019A</b> | <b>2020A</b> | <b>2021E</b> | <b>2022E</b> | <b>2023E</b> |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Sales revenue                          | 5,450        | 4,987        | 3,380        | 4,078        | 4,323        |
| <b>Normalised EBITDA</b>               | <b>435</b>   | <b>366</b>   | <b>237</b>   | <b>300</b>   | <b>326</b>   |
| Depreciation and amortisation          | (122)        | (163)        | (154)        | (144)        | (136)        |
| <b>Normalised EBIT</b>                 | <b>312</b>   | <b>203</b>   | <b>81</b>    | <b>155</b>   | <b>189</b>   |
| Net interest                           | (51)         | (66)         | (50)         | (50)         | (48)         |
| Associate income                       | (1)          | 0            | (2)          | 0            | 0            |
| Tax                                    | (61)         | 13           | (24)         | (29)         | (40)         |
| Minority interests                     | (2)          | (16)         | (7)          | (11)         | (11)         |
| <b>Normalised NPAT</b>                 | <b>196</b>   | <b>102</b>   | <b>16</b>    | <b>87</b>    | <b>113</b>   |
| Abnormals/other                        | (16)         | (42)         | 2            | 0            | 0            |
| <b>Reported NPAT</b>                   | <b>180</b>   | <b>60</b>    | <b>18</b>    | <b>87</b>    | <b>113</b>   |
| Normalised EPS (cps)                   | 49.0         | 25.6         | 3.0          | 16.7         | 21.7         |
| DPS (cps)                              | 43.0         | 16.5         | 0            | 23.0         | 23.0         |

| <b>Growth Rates</b> | <b>2019A</b> | <b>2020A</b> | <b>2021E</b> | <b>2022E</b> | <b>2023E</b> |
|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Revenue (%)         | 19           | -8           | -32          | 21           | 6            |
| EBITDA (%)          | -3           | -16          | -35          | 26           | 9            |
| EBIT (%)            | -10          | -35          | -60          | 91           | 22           |
| Normalised NPAT (%) | -7           | -48          | -85          | >100         | 30           |
| Normalised EPS (%)  | -7           | -48          | -88          | >100         | 30           |
| Ordinary DPS (%)    | 33           | -62          | -100         | n/a          | 0            |

| <b>Cash Flow (NZ\$m)</b>               | <b>2019A</b> | <b>2020A</b> | <b>2021E</b> | <b>2022E</b> | <b>2023E</b> |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <b>EBITDA</b>                          | <b>435</b>   | <b>366</b>   | <b>237</b>   | <b>300</b>   | <b>326</b>   |
| Working capital change                 | (159)        | 268          | (152)        | (37)         | (18)         |
| Interest & tax paid                    | (161)        | (124)        | (56)         | (87)         | (96)         |
| Other                                  | 223          | (194)        | 103          | (8)          | (8)          |
| <b>Operating cash flow</b>             | <b>338</b>   | <b>316</b>   | <b>132</b>   | <b>167</b>   | <b>204</b>   |
| Capital expenditure                    | (55)         | (102)        | (54)         | (52)         | (53)         |
| (Acquisitions)/divestments             | (28)         | 21           | (1)          | 0            | 0            |
| Other                                  | 4            | (29)         | (24)         | (24)         | (24)         |
| <b>Funding available/(required)</b>    | <b>259</b>   | <b>206</b>   | <b>53</b>    | <b>91</b>    | <b>127</b>   |
| Dividends paid                         | (152)        | (203)        | 0            | (42)         | (120)        |
| Equity raised/(returned)               | (1)          | 0            | 337          | 0            | 0            |
| <b>(Increase)/decrease in net debt</b> | <b>106</b>   | <b>3</b>     | <b>390</b>   | <b>49</b>    | <b>8</b>     |

| <b>Balance Sheet (NZ\$m)</b> | <b>2019A</b> | <b>2020A</b> | <b>2021E</b> | <b>2022E</b> | <b>2023E</b> |
|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Working capital              | 358          | 119          | 275          | 312          | 330          |
| Fixed assets                 | 830          | 819          | 790          | 763          | 737          |
| Intangibles                  | 668          | 786          | 598          | 553          | 515          |
| Right of use asset           | 0            | 282          | 280          | 280          | 280          |
| Other assets                 | 161          | 253          | 163          | 163          | 163          |
| <b>Total funds employed</b>  | <b>2,017</b> | <b>2,259</b> | <b>2,106</b> | <b>2,072</b> | <b>2,026</b> |
| Net debt/(cash)              | 827          | 1,083        | 696          | 635          | 615          |
| Lease liability              | 0            | 299          | 299          | 299          | 299          |
| Other liabilities            | 270          | 275          | 215          | 207          | 200          |
| Shareholder's funds          | 902          | 600          | 902          | 947          | 940          |
| Minority interests           | 18           | 2            | (5)          | (17)         | (28)         |
| <b>Total funding sources</b> | <b>2,017</b> | <b>2,259</b> | <b>2,106</b> | <b>2,072</b> | <b>2,026</b> |

\* Forsyth Barr target prices reflect valuation rolled forward at cost of equity less the next 12-months dividend

| <b>Valuation Ratios</b>  | <b>2019A</b> | <b>2020A</b> | <b>2021E</b> | <b>2022E</b> | <b>2023E</b> |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| EV/EBITDA (x)            | 4.8          | 6.6          | 10.6         | 7.8          | 7.1          |
| EV/EBIT (x)              | 6.8          | 11.9         | 31.0         | 15.0         | 12.3         |
| PE (x)                   | 5.4          | 10.4         | 88.8         | 15.9         | 12.3         |
| Price/NTA (x)            | 4.2          | n/a          | 4.6          | 3.7          | 3.5          |
| Free cash flow yield (%) | 20.5         | 15.5         | 5.6          | 8.3          | 10.9         |
| Net dividend yield (%)   | 16.2         | 6.2          | 0.0          | 8.6          | 8.6          |
| Gross dividend yield (%) | 22.5         | 8.6          | 0.0          | 12.0         | 12.0         |

| <b>Capital Structure</b>  | <b>2019A</b> | <b>2020A</b> | <b>2021E</b> | <b>2022E</b> | <b>2023E</b> |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Interest cover EBIT (x)   | 6.1          | 3.1          | 1.6          | 3.1          | 3.9          |
| Interest cover EBITDA (x) | 8.5          | 5.5          | 4.8          | 5.9          | 6.8          |
| Net debt/ND+E (%)         | 55.4         | 72.4         | 48.8         | 45.1         | 44.5         |
| Net debt/EBITDA (x)       | 1.9          | 3.0          | 2.9          | 2.1          | 1.9          |

| <b>Key Ratios</b>            | <b>2019A</b> | <b>2020A</b> | <b>2021E</b> | <b>2022E</b> | <b>2023E</b> |
|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Return on assets (%)         | 11.0         | 6.7          | 3.2          | 5.9          | 7.1          |
| Return on equity (%)         | 21.3         | 17.0         | 1.7          | 9.3          | 12.3         |
| Return on funds employed (%) | 15.8         | 13.2         | 3.0          | 7.9          | 9.9          |
| EBITDA margin (%)            | 8.0          | 7.3          | 7.0          | 7.3          | 7.5          |
| EBIT margin (%)              | 5.7          | 4.1          | 2.4          | 3.8          | 4.4          |
| Capex to sales (%)           | 1.0          | 2.0          | 1.6          | 1.3          | 1.2          |
| Capex to depreciation (%)    | 85           | 126          | 68           | 66           | 67           |
| Imputation (%)               | 100          | 100          | 100          | 100          | 100          |
| Pay-out ratio (%)            | 88           | 65           | 0            | 138          | 106          |

| <b>Operating Performance</b>        | <b>2019A</b> | <b>2020A</b> | <b>2021E</b> | <b>2022E</b> | <b>2023E</b> |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <b>Product volumes (m litres)</b>   |              |              |              |              |              |
| Petrol                              | 1,165        | 1,099        | 961          | 1,058        | 1,066        |
| Diesel - retail                     | 454          | 445          | 419          | 463          | 466          |
| Diesel - commercial                 | 812          | 769          | 761          | 786          | 819          |
| Other fuels                         | 1,193        | 1,120        | 420          | 550          | 746          |
| Supply - domestic                   | 544          | 537          | 494          | 527          | 529          |
| <b>Sub-total</b>                    | <b>4,168</b> | <b>3,970</b> | <b>3,055</b> | <b>3,385</b> | <b>3,626</b> |
| Supply - industry & export          | 280          | 67           | 52           | 30           | 30           |
| <b>Total Fuels</b>                  | <b>4,448</b> | <b>4,037</b> | <b>3,107</b> | <b>3,415</b> | <b>3,656</b> |
| Retail service stations             | 343          | 334          | 340          | 330          | 328          |
| Petrol/service station (m litres)   | 3.82         | 3.61         | 3.19         | 3.53         | 3.55         |
| Diesel/service station (m litres)   | 1.32         | 1.30         | 1.24         | 1.37         | 1.39         |
| <b>Gross profit (NZDm)</b>          |              |              |              |              |              |
| Fuels                               | 700          | 666          | 532          | 575          | 592          |
| Refining                            | 54           | 37           | (25)         | 3            | 23           |
| Non-fuels                           | 81           | 76           | 76           | 80           | 82           |
| Flick Electric                      | 1            | 2            | 3            | 4            | 4            |
| <b>Gross profit</b>                 | <b>836</b>   | <b>781</b>   | <b>585</b>   | <b>662</b>   | <b>702</b>   |
| Fuels gross margin (cpl)            | 16.8         | 16.8         | 17.4         | 17.0         | 16.3         |
| Fuels margin incl refining (cpl)    | 17.0         | 17.4         | 15.7         | 16.2         | 16.2         |
| Fuels margin excl supply (cpl)      | 18.0         | 17.7         | 16.6         | 17.1         | 17.0         |
| Non-fuels revenue/station (NZD 000) | 397          | 373          | 378          | 399          | 408          |

## Reassessing value – throwing the kitchen sink at volumes

The main focus of this report is looking at the potential effects of the government's announcement to bring in tail-pipe emissions targets (Clean Car Import Standard) and the Climate Change Commission's (CCC) draft report, which proposes banning the importation of petrol/diesel vehicles. We are adjusting our volume forecasts to be consistent with the Clean Car Import Standard (CCIS) and the banning of petrol/diesel vehicles from 2030. We view this as the worst case volume assumption as there are significant headwinds to be overcome to actually achieve the government's goals. However, following the release of the CCC draft report, it is clear that the market is again concerned about ZEL's long-term outlook.

### Valuation changes

The question we are addressing in this report is whether under worst case scenario, long-term volume assumptions, is there still value in ZEL? The answer is yes, despite the material pull-back in our valuation.

We have lowered our DCF -NZ\$1.58 (-32%) to NZ\$3.36/share. ~20% of the DCF change is due to the increase in our cost of capital assumption to 6.2% from 5.8% (due to rising bond rates). The market refocussing on the long-term outlook has also impacted on our market multiple and dividend yield based valuations.

Our revised target price is NZ\$3.45, a reduction of -20% (-NZ\$0.85).

**Figure 1. Summary of valuation changes**

|                     | Old<br>NZ\$/share | New<br>NZ\$/share | Movement        |             | Comment   |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------|---|
|                     |                   |                   | NZ\$/share      | %           |   |
| DCF                 | \$4.94            | \$3.36            | (\$1.58)        | -32%        | WACC of 6.2%, terminal growth rate (in 2060) of -5%                     |
| Market multiple     | \$3.90            | \$3.12            | (\$0.78)        | -20%        | Average of FY23 NPAT at PE of 9.5x and FY23 EBITDAF at a multiple of 7x |
| Dividend yield      | \$3.79            | \$3.19            | (\$0.60)        | -16%        | FY22 dividend of 23cps at a gross yield of 10.0% (cash yield of 7.2%)   |
| <b>Target price</b> | <b>\$4.30</b>     | <b>\$3.45</b>     | <b>(\$0.85)</b> | <b>-20%</b> | Equal weighting of the above three valuation metrics                    |

Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

Whilst we have pulled back our valuation materially, we are retaining our OUTPERFORM rating for two key reasons (in addition to the value upside).

1. Our revised long-term valuation is, in our view, a worst case scenario from a volume perspective. In addition, our margin assumptions also gradually decline from current low levels due to ongoing competition and therefore do not keep pace with cost inflation.
2. We see three positive near-term catalysts:
  1. ZEL will be reinstating its dividend in FY22 and will be providing guidance at the FY21 result in early May. Having been touted as a dividend stock, not paying a dividend for a year (even if COVID-19 was outside of its control) is a serious offence. Reinstatement of the dividend will at least put ZEL back on the radar of income funds.
  2. We have not factored any earnings upside for the refinery converting to an import terminal. We estimate the upside to be ~+NZ\$10m, subject to the agreed pipeline and import terminal fees.
  3. Its weak catalyst, but relative to recent disappointments meeting FY21 guidance should help improve sentiment.

### Forecast changes


#### Long-term EBITDAF pull back, more conservative dividend outlook (but it is still healthy for a decade)

We are making material reductions to our long-term volume forecasts as we factor in a worst case downside scenario for industry volumes following the release of the CCC's draft report and the government announcing it is implementing a CCIS. There is a flow on effect to earnings, although most of the impact is not until the end of the 2020s, which is when volume reductions start to bite.

Other changes we have made include:

- Pulling back our dividend forecast for the next decade to 23cps (down -2cps from 25cps). The main driver in the reduction of our dividend forecast is not lower forecast earnings, but a view that the ZEL board will be more cognisant of the need to repay debt. We assume ZEL will target to be debt-free by 2035. That said, the decline in our dividend forecast post-2030 is linked to lower earnings.
- Assuming the refinery converts to an import terminal as at 31 March 2023 (i.e. at the end of FY23). This has little change on earnings, and in our view there is upside earnings risk of ~+NZ\$10m vs. the modest refining contribution in our old forecast.

Figure 2. Long-term EBITDAF and dividend forecast changes



Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

### Significant long-term volume forecast changes

Our revised volume forecasts assume no light vehicle sales volumes from 2048. We had previously assumed a gradual reduction with ~10% of New Zealand's light vehicle fleet staying as petrol/diesel.


Unlike most other countries, transport in New Zealand has to do much of the heavy lifting to reduce carbon emissions. New Zealand's electricity system is already a low carbon system, hence, to meet the climate change obligations other parts of the economy must decarbonise and transport is the easiest (although that is still hard).

We view our new base case volume assumption as a worst case scenario. In our view, the challenges to meet the government and CCC goals are immense. New Zealand's transport fleet has to improve at a faster rate than any other country has achieved thus far, and there are question marks about whether the technology improvement required to enable the transition will be fast enough. Our revised retail volume forecasts assume:

- All new vehicle registrations meet the CCIS (on average 105gCO<sub>2</sub>/km from 2025)
- Only EVs from 2030 onwards
- Steady closure of service stations from 2030 onwards (as volume declines hit)

Our commercial diesel forecast assumptions are broadly consistent with CCC's fuel efficiency assumptions. Previously we had assumed heavy vehicles would not electrify as long haul trucking does not work with batteries. Whilst we are still sceptical heavy long-distance trucking will be able to electrify, there are certain applications that are well suited to electrification, such as buses and relatively short distance trucking with moderate payloads will likely electrify in time. We do not consider hydrogen in this report, however, if it were to become a meaningful part of the transport fuel market we believe ZEL should be able to capture its fair share.

Figure 3. Volume forecast changes



Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

## Regulatory pressure to lower emissions ratchets up a notch

The long-term outlook for fuel volumes has become cloudier with the release of the Climate Change Commission (CCC) report pushing for a ban on petrol/diesel fuelled vehicles between 2030 and 2035, and the government implementing a “Clean Car Import Standard” (CCIS) targeting more fuel efficient vehicles (legislation is due in parliament in 2021). The CCIS will have an earlier impact on fuel consumption than the outright ban on fossil-fuelled vehicles as that comes into meaningful effect from 2023. If vehicle importers want to meet the standards, EVs (both battery electric and plug-in hybrids) are going to have to be part of the solution.

### The Clean Car Import Standard – what it is and what it means

The government is bringing in a CCIS, based on overseas models, where the fuel efficiency of imports is assessed against an emissions standard (can be on an annual basis). The goal is for light vehicle imports (under 3.5 tonnes) to have CO<sub>2</sub> tailpipe emissions of 105gCO<sub>2</sub>/km by 2025. Europe already has this standard and Japan implemented the 105g CO<sub>2</sub>/km standard in 2014. NZ is one of the last countries to adopt an emissions standard. Average 2020 tailpipe emissions of new registrations were 171g CO<sub>2</sub>/km, meaning New Zealand needs a 39% improvement in four years – the proposed standard is a meaningful step change.

Given the material change from existing emission levels, there is an annual step-down in the target until 2025, with the biggest change taking place in 2025. In recognition that there are different classes of vehicle, the overall 105g CO<sub>2</sub>/km target is broken into two categories. The car/SUV target is 102g CO<sub>2</sub>/km and the utes/other light vehicle target is 132g CO<sub>2</sub>/km.


The emissions target does not differentiate between new or used imports.

**Figure 4. Cabinet agreed gCO<sub>2</sub>/km targets for new imports**

|                | 2020<br>actual | 2021<br>projected | 2022<br>target | 2023<br>target | 2024<br>target | 2025<br>target |
|----------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Cars & SUVs    | 161            | 150               | 140            | 130            | 120            | 102            |
| Vans & utes    | 220            | 220               | 205            | 190            | 175            | 132            |
| <b>Average</b> | <b>171</b>     | <b>162</b>        | <b>153</b>     | <b>139</b>     | <b>128</b>     | <b>105</b>     |
| % car/SUV      | 83%            | 83%               | 80%            | 85%            | 85%            | 90%            |
| % ute/van      | 17%            | 17%               | 20%            | 15%            | 15%            | 10%            |

Source: CCIS cabinet paper, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 5. Cabinet agreed gCO<sub>2</sub>/km targets for new imports**



Source: CCIS cabinet paper, Forsyth Barr analysis

To ensure compliance there is a penalty regime for importers that do not meet the target. The penalties start being charged from 1 January 2023, with a +50% increase in the penalty from 1 January 2025. The 2025 penalty for new vehicles is \$75/gCO<sub>2</sub> above the “weight-adjusted” target for that particular vehicle. To give a sense of the potential sticker price impact, we estimate that a new Ford Ranger would face a 2025 penalty of ~NZ\$6,600 for an ~NZ\$50,000 vehicle. That said, fuel efficiency improvement in the interim and Ford’s hybrid offering will reduce the size of any penalty. The penalty for used imports is 50% of the new car penalty.

### The new goal is very challenging – vehicle prices are likely to increase and fuel volume forecasts based on the emissions standard is probably worst case

In our view the 2025 target is ambitious for New Zealand, for a variety of reasons. It is likely that the sticker price for new and used imports into New Zealand will increase as importers face the penalties for missing the emissions targets.

#### 1. There are no 100% fossil fuelled vehicles that meet the current required standard

Figure 6. converts the gCO<sub>2</sub>/km standard into the more common fuel consumption/100km. The smallest petrol vehicles currently have emissions just above the 102gCO<sub>2</sub>/km target. The Suzuki Swift (NZ’s most popular small vehicle) fuel economy is 4.6L/100km to 4.8L/100km. The only vehicles that do meet the efficiency are BEVs, PHEVs and hybrids.

Hybrid vehicles (popularised by Toyota) typically produce  $\sim 90\text{gCO}_2/\text{km}$ , ranging between  $76\text{gCO}_2/\text{km}$  to  $102\text{gCO}_2/\text{km}$  depending on the size of vehicle. PHEVs produce  $\sim 40\text{gCO}_2/\text{km}$ .

**Figure 6. Conversion of emission to fuel economy targets**


|                             | CO2 target<br>gCO <sub>2</sub> /km | Regular petrol<br>fuel economy<br>L/100km | Premium petrol<br>fuel economy<br>L/100km | Diesel fuel<br>economy<br>L/100km |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------------|
| Car/SUVs                    | 102                                | 4.5                                       | 4.4                                       | 3.9                               |
| Utes/other light commercial | 132                                | 5.8                                       | 5.6                                       | 5.1                               |
| <b>Fleet</b>                | <b>105</b>                         | <b>4.6</b>                                | <b>4.5</b>                                | <b>4.0</b>                        |

Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

## 2. Fuel efficiency improvements are steady, but well below the required rate

Fuel efficiency improvement across imports has been 1.4% per annum for the last decade. New petrol vehicles have improved at a faster rate (2.2%), with diesel vehicle emissions improving at a much slower rate (0.3%) – we suspect due to the trend towards larger vehicles. However, we note the rate of improvement has stepped up in recent years due mainly to used petrol imports, which appears to be linked to rising fuel prices. There has also been significant growth in hybrids (Figure 10.).


**Figure 8. Average emissions of new registrations (new and used)**



Source: NZTA, Forsyth Barr analysis

To achieve the car/SUV target of  $102\text{gCO}_2/\text{km}$  we note below several scenarios built around EV take-up. Unsurprisingly, the greater the EV take-up, the more likely it is NZ will achieve the targets. In 2020 EV (BEV or PHEV) registrations was 2.3% of total light vehicle registrations. The Norwegians achieved that level of EV penetration in 2012 and five years later hit 30% – so it is possible. However, Norway provided large subsidies and other incentives to consumers to buy electric – it is highly unlikely the NZ Government will get close to the level of subsidy Norway provided.

**Figure 10. % of new registrations (new and used)**




Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 7. Fleet emissions and small car fuel efficiency**

|                               | Typical emissions<br>gCO <sub>2</sub> /km | Small car fuel efficiency<br>L/100km |
|-------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| PHEV                          | 42  | VW Polo 4.5                          |
| Petrol Hybrid                 | 93  | Suzuki Swift 4.6                     |
| Average new entrants to fleet | 170                                       | Toyota Yaris 4.9                     |
|                               |   | Mazda 2 5.3                          |

Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 9. Emissions rate of improvement**



Source: NZTA, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 11. Scenarios that achieve  $102\text{gCO}_2/\text{km}$  for cars/SUVs**

|               | Emissions (2025)<br>gCO <sub>2</sub> /km | 2020<br>sales | Scenario weightings |     |     |
|---------------|--|---------------|---------------------|-----|-----|
|               |  |               | A                   | B   | C   |
| BEV           | 0  | 2.0%          | 10%                 | 20% | 30% |
| PHEV          | 35                                       | 0.6%          | 5%                  | 5%  | 5%  |
| Petrol hybrid | 86                                       | 13.0%         | 47%                 | 25% | 3%  |
| Petrol/diesel | 158                                      | 84.4%         | 38%                 | 50% | 62% |

Source: Forsyth Barr analysis



### 3. Other than Toyota, car manufacturers are ill equipped to meet the new standard

The only vehicles that meet the new standard are battery electric vehicles (BEV), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) and petrol hybrids (the Toyota Prius being the most common). At present, only the Toyota and Lexus sister marques have a wide range of vehicles that can meet the goal, with some marques only recently releasing hybrid versions of a model or two. Toyota has the greatest market share (16% in 2020) and the increase in hybrid sales implies Toyota is already selling more hybrids than standard petrol/diesel vehicles.

Whilst manufacturers are all looking to improve fuel efficiency, it will be a significant challenge for many marques to meet the new standards.

**Figure 12. New car models that meet the 102gCO<sub>2</sub>/km target for cars/SUVs sold in New Zealand in 2020**

| Marque                                       | BEVs<br>Models | PHEVs<br>Models | Hybrids<br>Models | New Zealand<br>2020 new car market share |
|--|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|--|
| Audi   | 1              | 1               |                   | 2%                                       |
| BMW  | 1              | 7               |                   | 2%                                       |
| Ford   |                | 1               | 4                 | 4%                                       |
| Hyundai                                      | 2              | 1               | 1                 | 7%                                       |
| Jaguar                                       | 1              |                 |                   |  |
| Kia  | 1              | 1               | 1                 | 10%                                      |
| Land Rover                                   |                | 1               |                   |  |
| Lexus  |                |                 | 9                 |  |
| Mazda  |                |                 | 2                 | 8%                                       |
| Mercedes                                     | 1              | 3               |                   | 2%                                       |
| MG   | 1              |                 |                   |  |
| Mini   | 1              | 1               |                   |  |
| Mitsubishi                                   |                | 1               |                   | 8%                                       |
| Nissan                                       | 1              |                 |                   | 5%                                       |
| Porsche                                      | 1              | 2               |                   |  |
| Renault                                      | 1              |                 |                   |  |
| Subaru                                       |                |                 | 2                 | 3%                                       |
| Suzuki                                       |                |                 | 1                 | 7%                                       |
| Tesla  | 3              |                 |                   |  |
| Toyota                                       |                | 1               | 9                 | 16%                                      |
| Volvo  |                | 4               |                   |  |
| VW   | 1              |                 |                   | 4%                                       |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                 | <b>16</b>      | <b>24</b>       | <b>29</b>         | <b>77%</b>                               |
| <b>Top 15 brands with nothing below 102g</b> |                |                 |                   |  |
| Holden/GM                                    |                |                 |                   | 4%                                       |
| Honda  |                |                 |                   | 4%                                       |

Source: MIA, Forsyth Barr analysis


### 4. The government assumes a rapid drop in ute/van market share – this appears optimistic

In the cabinet paper supporting the policy introduction it assumes that ute sales will drop from 17.5% to ~10% in 2025 (refer Figure 5.). Whilst new ute sales have plateaued in recent years, there is little sign of a decline. If ute sales remain high, the cabinet paper indicated the government will reduce allowable emissions (e.g. car/SUV target reduces to 100gCO<sub>2</sub>/km) to ensure the overall 105gCO<sub>2</sub>/km target is met.

### 5. It is easier to meet 105gCO<sub>2</sub>/km in Europe/Japan as the fleet make-up/starting point is very different


Another issue that the cabinet paper glosses over is the fact the vehicle fleets in Europe and Japan are materially different. In 2018, SUV sales in Japan were only ~12% and in both Europe and the UK were less than 40%. Europe and Japan have ostensibly been able to meet the 105gCO<sub>2</sub>/km standard with relatively low uptake of EVs. In 2019 European EV sales were 4.6% and in Japan 0.9%. Achieving the emissions target with such low EV penetration will not be possible in NZ. Japan has been aided by a very high level of hybrid sales, which are above 25%.

Figure 13. NZ new sales by vehicle type



Source: MIA, Forsyth Barr analysis

Figure 14. 2018 SUV sales %



Source: Jato, MIA, Forsyth Barr analysis



## EVs only policy from 2030 looking more likely

There is a growing call for NZ to follow other overseas nations and ban the import of fossil fuel vehicles from 2030 and align NZ to the UK and/or Japanese dates bans are implemented. In its draft report the CCC advocates for a date sometime between 2030 and 2035, with its modelling assuming 2032. Putting aside the question whether this will be achievable or not, a ban from 2030 is the worst case scenario for NZ fuel retailers and hence that is what we have adopted as our base assumption.

With the notable exceptions of Norway and South Korea, all countries are targeting 2030 or later as the date to implement a ban.

**Figure 15. Countries/US States aiming to ban fossil fuelled vehicles**

| Year | 2025        | 2030           | 2032     | 2035               | 2040             |
|------|-------------|----------------|----------|--------------------|------------------|
|      | Norway      | Belgium diesel | Scotland | Belgium petrol     | Egypt            |
|      | South Korea | Britain ICE    |          | Britain hybrid     | France           |
|      |             | Denmark ICE    |          | Denmark hybrid     | Spain            |
|      |             | Germany        |          | Japan              | Taiwan cars      |
|      |             | India          |          | Taiwan motorcycles | Sri Lanka        |
|      |             | Israel         |          | California State   | Portugal         |
|      |             | Netherlands    |          |                    | New Jersey State |
|      |             | Iceland        |          |                    |                  |
|      |             | Sweden         |          |                    |                  |
|      |             | Slovenia       |          |                    |                  |
|      |             | Iceland        |          |                    |                  |

Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

Whilst we are adopting the ban as our base assumption, we continue to have a degree of scepticism that a ban will be politically enforceable by 2030 for two key reasons.

First, the rate of improvement in EVs over the past 5 years does not bode well. EVs are still very expensive relative to their petrol/diesel counterparts and the standard EV price point has not improved, north of NZ\$60,000. What has improved is range – however, with a typical battery range between 300km to 400km, that is insufficient for mass take-up, in our view. So range still needs to improve and the selling price point has to drop ~30%. In addition, the options available to consumer need to materially improve.

That said, car manufacturers are investing in EVs in a big way. Whilst the available options are limited at present, that will grow, and grow quickly within the next five years. Although many manufacturers are not aiming to be 100% electric by 2030, by far the most common year to start banning fossil fuelled vehicles globally.

Second, the fast shift to EVs places a greater burden on lower socio-economic groups that are unable to afford the higher sticker price of EVs. In our view, the social consequences of a fast transition will be challenging for politicians to overcome.

**Figure 16. Car manufacturer stated EV goals**

| Marque     | Near term  | Long term target   |
|------------|--|--|
| Ford       | Invest \$22bn in electrification by 2025             | European all electric by 2030                                |
| GM         | Spending \$27bn to launch 30 BEVs by the end of 2025 | Fully electric by 2035                                       |
| Honda      | 100% electrified (BEV/PHEV) sales by 2022            | European all electric by 2035                                |
| Hyundai    | 560k BBEVs per year by 2025                          | Wants 8-10% of global BEV market by 2040                     |
| Kia        | 11 BEVs by 2026                                      | By 2030, 40 percent of all sales electrified (BEV/PHEV)      |
| Mazda      | By 2025 the majority of models electrified           | Electrified (BEV/PHEV) variant of all models by 2030         |
| Mitsubishi |  | 50 percent of sales to be BEVs by 2030                       |
| Nissan     | Eight new models by 2023                             | All cars sold in key markets electric by 2030                |
| Toyota     | 10 pure-electric models by 2025                      | 40% electrified (PHEV or full-electric) by 2025, 70% by 2030 |
| Volvo      | 50% BEV, 50% PHEV by 2025                            | Fully electric by 2030                                       |
| VW         | 1m BEVs by end of 2023                               | 70% of Europe sales electric by early 2030s                  |

Source: Company websites, Forsyth Barr analysis

## Retail margins under pressure from rising crude prices

Retail margins are under pressure, again. However, our analysis indicates that the margin pressure that is being observed at present is due to rising crude oil prices as opposed to another structural step-down. We have broken the last four years into several distinct periods, when crude oil prices were rising at a rapid rate, when crude oil prices were falling at a rapid rate and when prices were relatively stable.


The analysis supports the view that rising crude prices squeezes margins and falling crude prices inflates margins. It also highlights the structural change in retail margins that took place in 2019, with retail margins falling -5cpl vs. the mid-point of the preceding periods. The average retail margin over the last four months, when crude prices have risen steadily is ~-3.5cpl lower than the last stable period. This decline is similar to the level of decline vs. the mid-point seen during past periods where margins were rising.

**Figure 17. MBIE margin analysis**

| Crude movement                |                 | Up          | Down        | Up          | Flat        | Down        | Flat        | Up          |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Start date                    |                 | 30-Jun-17   | 30-Sep-18   | 31-Dec-18   | 31-May-19   | 24-Jan-20   | 30-Jun-20   | 31-Oct-20   |
| End date                      |                 | 30-Sep-18   | 31-Dec-18   | 24-Apr-19   | 24-Jan-20   | 20-Mar-20   | 31-Oct-20   | 5-Mar-21    |
| Start crude price             | NZD\$/barrel    | 65          | 125         | 83          | 100         | 95          | 65          | 58          |
| End crude price               | NZD\$/barrel    | 125         | 83          | 110         | 95          | 47          | 58          | 88          |
| Crude movement                | NZD\$/barrel    | 60          | -42         | 27          | -5          | -48         | -7          | 30          |
| Crude movement (NZD\$/barrel) | %               | 92%         | -34%        | 33%         | -5%         | -51%        | -11%        | 52%         |
| Crude oil change / week       | NZD\$/barrel    | +\$0.9      | -\$3.2      | +\$1.7      | -\$0.1      | -\$6.0      | -\$0.4      | +\$1.7      |
| <b>Average MBIE margin</b>    |                 |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |
| Regular                       | NZ\$ cpl        | 28.7        | 35.8        | 28.0        | 26.9        | 35.5        | 25.7        | 21.9        |
| Premium                       | NZ\$ cpl        | 39.6        | 45.6        | 38.0        | 38.2        | 47.8        | 38.3        | 36.6        |
| Diesel                        | NZ\$ cpl        | 33.3        | 40.0        | 40.0        | 33.6        | 43.5        | 38.3        | 34.8        |
| <b>Blended</b>                | <b>NZ\$ cpl</b> | <b>31.5</b> | <b>38.3</b> | <b>32.5</b> | <b>30.3</b> | <b>39.3</b> | <b>30.7</b> | <b>27.3</b> |

Source: MBIE, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 18. Regular petrol importer margins**



Source: MBIE, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 19. Spot MBIE margins**

|               | Regular petrol | Premium petrol | Diesel | Blended     |
|---------------|----------------|----------------|--------|-------------|
| <b>NZ cpl</b> |                |                |        |             |
| Spot          | 20.4           | 36.3           | 34.8   | <b>26.9</b> |
| Last 4 weeks  | 19.0           | 34.9           | 33.8   | <b>25.6</b> |
| Last 3 months | 20.1           | 35.3           | 34.5   | <b>26.4</b> |
| FY21 YTD      | 27.1           | 40.7           | 38.5   | <b>32.4</b> |
| FY20          | 28.7           | 39.8           | 36.0   | <b>32.5</b> |
| FY19          | 30.2           | 40.8           | 35.8   | <b>33.5</b> |
| FY18          | 29.0           | 40.1           | 34.9   | <b>32.5</b> |

Source: MBIE, Forsyth Barr analysis

We have trimmed our short-term 2H21 retail margin assumption -0.5cpl to 22.3cpl to reflect the short-term weakness in margins. Our long-term assumptions are unchanged, but already assume ongoing retail margin weakness. Our FY22 retail margin assumption is 23.0cpl, -3.4% lower than FY21.

## February 2021 volumes, less worse than January 2021, but still weak


February 2021 volumes are still weaker than the numbers ZEL was posting in late 2020. Z branded volumes had their worst month since August 2020 (when Auckland went into its second lockdown) with daily average February 2021 down -6% on February 2020. Commercial diesel volumes were also down on the pcp, the second month in a row, following six consecutive months ahead of pcp volumes.

The positive volume story has come from domestic supply volumes up +2% on February 2020 (particularly diesel, up +4%) and bitumen, up +7% on February 2020.


**Figure 20. Monthly fuel volumes**

|                                   |        |        |        | Daily avg vol % chg |           | Commentary   |
|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------|-----------|--|
|                                   |        |        |        | % chg               | % chg vs. |  |
| m litres                          | Feb-20 | Jan-21 | Feb-21 | vs. pcp             | prior mth |  |
| Volumes by brand/product          |        |        |        |                     |           |  |
| Petrol - Z                        | 63     | 60     | 57     | -7%                 | 5%        | The worst petrol outcome since August 2020 when Auckland was in lockdown<br>Soft volumes, but not significantly so. Caltex has less exposure to Auckland |
| Petrol - Caltex                   | 28     | 28     | 26     | -3%                 | 4%        |  |
| Petrol - Domestic supply          | 11     | 10     | 10     | -4%                 | 11%       | Continuation of diesel volume decline for Z, but not as weak as petrol   |
| Diesel - Z                        | 26     | 24     | 24     | -3%                 | 10%       |  |
| Diesel - Caltex                   | 12     | 12     | 12     | 0%                  | 11%       | Good Caltex diesel performance vs. other retail segments   |
| Diesel - Domestic supply          | 33     | 30     | 34     | 4%                  | 22%       | Strong diesel recovery   |
| Diesel - Commercial               | 67     | 61     | 62     | -5%                 | 11%       | Second month in a row of below ppc commercial diesel volumes   |
| Other - Jet                       | 68     | 27     | 24     | -64%                | -2%       | Jet volumes consistent with recent months  |
| Other - Marine                    | 11     | 0      | 2      | -86%                | 368%      | Strong bitumen month and rebound on January  |
| Other - Bitumen & other           | 20     | 10     | 21     | 7%                  | 133%      |  |
| Total ZEL excl export             | 340    | 263    | 271    | -17%                | 14%       | ZEL supplied blendstock for refining purposes to a competitor  |
| Terminal gate sales               | 0      | 11     | 12     |                     | 9%        |  |
| Industry & Export                 | 1      | 1      | 17     |                     |           |  |
| Total ZEL                         | 341    | 276    | 300    | -9%                 | 20%       |  |
| Volumes by category               |        |        |        |                     |           |  |
| Total Z                           | 89     | 85     | 81     | -6%                 | 6%        | The biggest bright spot in otherwise weak volumes  |
| Total Caltex                      | 40     | 40     | 38     | -2%                 | 6%        |  |
| Total retail petrol (excl supply) | 91     | 88     | 83     | -5%                 | 4%        | Commercial still dominated by jet and marine declines  |
| Total retail diesel (excl supply) | 38     | 36     | 36     | -2%                 | 10%       |  |
| Total Domestic supply             | 45     | 41     | 44     | 2%                  | 19%       |  |
| Total retail (incl supply)        | 174    | 165    | 163    | -3%                 | 9%        |  |
| Total commercial                  | 166    | 98     | 108    | -33%                | 21%       |  |
| Total volumes                     | 340    | 263    | 271    | -17%                | 14%       |  |


Source: ZEL, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 21. Daily average Z branded volumes**



Source: ZEL, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 22. Daily average Caltex branded volumes**


Source: ZEL, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 23. Daily average domestic supply volumes**


Source: ZEL, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 24. Daily average commercial volumes**


Source: ZEL, Forsyth Barr analysis

## Short-term forecast changes

ZEL has narrowed its FY21 EBITDAF guidance range to between NZ\$235m to NZ\$245m (from NZ\$235m to NZ\$265m). Our old EBITDAF forecast was NZ\$243m, which we have trimmed to NZ\$237m. The main changes are:


- A -0.5cpl lower 2H21 retail gross margin due to the ongoing increases in crude oil prices squeezing margins
- A -1% reduction in forecast volumes following the weak monthly volume update

FY22 & FY23 forecasts are trimmed due mainly to a reduction in jet and marine volumes. Jet because international travel is constantly pushed further out and marine due to the refinery producing less fuel oil and ZEL exiting the use of the Aniwhenua barge in Auckland.

Figure 25. Short-term forecast changes

| NZ\$m                                  | FY21<br>Old  | FY21<br>New  | %<br>Chg    | FY22<br>Old  | FY22<br>New  | %<br>Chg    | FY23<br>Old  | FY23<br>New  | %<br>Chg   |
|--|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------|
| Revenue                                | 3,384        | 3,380        | 0%          | 3,986        | 4,078        | 2%          | 4,149        | 4,323        | 4%         |
| <b>Gross profit</b>                    | <b>592</b>   | <b>585</b>   | <b>-1%</b>  | <b>671</b>   | <b>662</b>   | <b>-1%</b>  | <b>702</b>   | <b>702</b>   | <b>0%</b>  |
| Gross Margin                           | 17.5%        | 17.3%        | -1%         | 16.8%        | 16.2%        | -4%         | 16.9%        | 16.2%        | -4%        |
| Operating costs                        | (349)        | (348)        | 0%          | (358)        | (363)        | 1%          | (367)        | (376)        | 2%         |
| <b>EBITDAF</b>                         | <b>243</b>   | <b>237</b>   | <b>-2%</b>  | <b>313</b>   | <b>300</b>   | <b>-4%</b>  | <b>335</b>   | <b>326</b>   | <b>-3%</b> |
| Depreciation & amortisation            | (154)        | (154)        | 0%          | (144)        | (144)        | 0%          | (136)        | (136)        | 0%         |
| <b>EBIT</b>                            | <b>89</b>    | <b>83</b>    | <b>-7%</b>  | <b>169</b>   | <b>155</b>   | <b>-8%</b>  | <b>198</b>   | <b>189</b>   | <b>-4%</b> |
| Net Interest                           | (50)         | (50)         | 0%          | (50)         | (50)         | 2%          | (47)         | (48)         | 3%         |
| Other                                  | 4            | 4            | 0%          | -            | -            | -           | -            | -            | -          |
| <b>Pre-tax profit</b>                  | <b>44</b>    | <b>38</b>    | <b>-14%</b> | <b>119</b>   | <b>105</b>   | <b>-12%</b> | <b>151</b>   | <b>141</b>   | <b>-7%</b> |
| Tax expense                            | (26)         | (24)         | -7%         | (33)         | (29)         | -12%        | (42)         | (40)         | -7%        |
| <b>NPAT</b>                            | <b>18</b>    | <b>13</b>    | <b>-25%</b> | <b>86</b>    | <b>76</b>    | <b>-12%</b> | <b>109</b>   | <b>102</b>   | <b>-7%</b> |
| Minority interest                      | 7            | 7            | 0%          | 11           | 11           | 0%          | 11           | 11           | 0%         |
| NPAT post-minorities                   | 25           | 21           | -17%        | 97           | 87           | -11%        | 120          | 113          | -6%        |
| <b>Normalised Profit</b>               | <b>20</b>    | <b>16</b>    | <b>-22%</b> | <b>97</b>    | <b>87</b>    | <b>-11%</b> | <b>120</b>   | <b>113</b>   | <b>-6%</b> |
| Earnings per share (eps)               | 3.8          | 3.0          | -22%        | 18.7         | 16.7         | -11%        | 23.1         | 21.7         | -6%        |
| Dividend (cps)                         | -            | -            | -           | 25.0         | 23.0         | -8%         | 25.0         | 23.0         | -8%        |
| <b>Key operating assumptions</b>       |              |              |             |              |              |             |              |              |            |
| Retail - petrol                        | 969          | 961          | -1%         | 1,064        | 1,058        | -1%         | 1,059        | 1,066        | 1%         |
| Retail - diesel                        | 426          | 419          | -2%         | 469          | 463          | -1%         | 466          | 466          | 0%         |
| Commercial - diesel                    | 775          | 761          | -2%         | 798          | 786          | -1%         | 817          | 819          | 0%         |
| Commercial - jet                       | 250          | 263          | 5%          | 527          | 406          | -23%        | 671          | 603          | -10%       |
| Commercial - marine                    | 42           | 39           | -7%         | 39           | 12           | -69%        | 41           | 13           | -69%       |
| Commercial - bitumen & other           | 110          | 118          | 7%          | 125          | 133          | 6%          | 127          | 130          | 2%         |
| Domestic supply                        | 505          | 494          | -2%         | 539          | 527          | -2%         | 541          | 529          | -2%        |
| <b>ZEL specific volumes (m litres)</b> | <b>3,078</b> | <b>3,055</b> | <b>-1%</b>  | <b>3,560</b> | <b>3,385</b> | <b>-5%</b>  | <b>3,722</b> | <b>3,626</b> | <b>-3%</b> |
| Industry and export supply             | 39           | 52           | 33%         | 30           | 30           | 0%          | 30           | 30           | 0%         |
| Terminal gate sales                    | 112          | 111          | -1%         | 150          | 150          | 0%          | 150          | 150          | 0%         |
| <b>Total fuel volumes (m litres)</b>   | <b>3,117</b> | <b>3,107</b> | <b>0%</b>   | <b>3,590</b> | <b>3,415</b> | <b>-5%</b>  | <b>3,752</b> | <b>3,656</b> | <b>-3%</b> |
| GM excl supply (cpl)                   | 17.5         | 17.4         | 0%          | 16.4         | 17.0         | 4%          | 15.9         | 16.3         | 3%         |
| GM incl refining (cpl)                 | 16.7         | 16.6         | -1%         | 16.5         | 17.1         | 3%          | 16.6         | 17.0         | 2%         |
| <b>Gross profit make-up</b>            |              |              |             |              |              |             |              |              |            |
| Fuels gross profit                     | 538          | 532          | -1%         | 583          | 575          | -1%         | 590          | 592          | 0%         |
| Refining gross profit                  | (25)         | (25)         | 2%          | 5            | 3            | -36%        | 26           | 23           | -11%       |
| Non-fuel gross profit                  | 76           | 76           | 0%          | 79           | 80           | 1%          | 81           | 82           | 1%         |
| NZR dividend                           | -            | -            | -           | -            | -            | -           | -            | -            | -          |
| Flick gross profit                     | 3            | 3            | 0%          | 4            | 4            | 0%          | 4            | 4            | 0%         |
|  | <b>592</b>   | <b>585</b>   | <b>-1%</b>  | <b>671</b>   | <b>662</b>   | <b>-1%</b>  | <b>702</b>   | <b>702</b>   | <b>0%</b>  |

Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 26. Price performance**


Source: Eikon, Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 27. Substantial shareholders**

| Shareholder             | Latest Holding |
|-------------------------|----------------|
| ACC                     | 9.3%           |
| L1 Capital Partners Pty | 5.0%           |


Source: NZX, Forsyth Barr analysis, NOTE: based on SPH notices only

**Figure 28. International valuation comparisons**


| Company   | Code   | Price     | Mkt Cap (m) | PE 2021E | PE 2022E | EV/EBITDA 2021E | EV/EBITDA 2022E | EV/EBIT 2021E | EV/EBIT 2022E | Cash Yld 2022E |
|---|--------|-----------|-------------|----------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| (metrics re-weighted to reflect ZEL's balance date - March) |        |           |             |          |          |                 |                 |               |               |                |
| Z Energy  | ZEL NZ | NZ\$2.66  | NZ\$1,384   | >50x     | 15.9x    | 10.4x           | 8.2x            | 30.3x         | 15.9x         | 8.6%           |
| SUBURBAN PROPANE PARTNERS LP                                | SPH US | US\$14.98 | US\$937     | 14.2x    | 13.2x    | 8.4x            | 8.7x            | 16.3x         | 16.3x         | 8.0%           |
| AMPOL   | ALD AT | A\$23.40  | A\$5,576    | <0x      | 16.8x    | <0x             | 6.9x            | <0x           | 11.9x         | 3.5%           |
| VIVA ENERGY GROUP   | VEA AT | A\$1.71   | A\$2,741    | <0x      | 24.4x    | 15.7x           | 7.5x            | <0x           | 17.7x         | 3.1%           |
| CONTACT ENERGY *  | CEN NZ | NZ\$7.07  | NZ\$5,409   | 20.3x    | 19.7x    | 13.6x           | 13.2x           | 26.2x         | 25.1x         | 5.1%           |
| MERCURY *   | MCY NZ | NZ\$6.13  | NZ\$8,351   | 30.4x    | 26.6x    | 18.9x           | 16.7x           | 32.0x         | 27.4x         | 3.0%           |
| TRUSTPOWER *  | TPW NZ | NZ\$8.06  | NZ\$2,523   | 30.7x    | 26.0x    | 16.5x           | 14.7x           | 21.6x         | 18.7x         | 4.2%           |
| MERIDIAN ENERGY *   | MEL NZ | NZ\$5.49  | NZ\$14,069  | 33.9x    | 34.1x    | 21.4x           | 21.5x           | 37.1x         | 37.1x         | 3.1%           |
| GENESIS ENERGY *  | GNE NZ | NZ\$3.90  | NZ\$4,070   | 21.2x    | 17.8x    | 13.2x           | 12.2x           | 27.6x         | 23.4x         | 4.5%           |
| Compco Average:   |        |           |             | 25.1x    | 22.3x    | 15.4x           | 12.7x           | 26.8x         | 22.2x         | 4.3%           |
| ZEL Relative:   |        |           |             | n/a      | -29%     | -32%            | -35%            | 13%           | -28%          | 101%           |

EV = Current Market Cap + Actual Net Debt

Source: \*Forsyth Barr analysis, Bloomberg Consensus, Compco metrics re-weighted to reflect headline (ZEL) companies fiscal year end

**Figure 29. Consensus EPS momentum (NZ\$)**


Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

**Figure 30. One year forward PE (x)**


Source: Forsyth Barr analysis

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|--|-------------------|----------------|---------------------|
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